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Abstract
As observers of the universe we are quantum physical systems within it. If the universe is very
large in space and/or time, the probability becomes significant that the data on which we base
predictions is replicated at other locations in spacetime. The physical conditions at these locations
that are not specified by the data may differ. Predictions of our future observations therefore
require an assumed probability distribution (the xerographic distribution) for our location among
the possible ones. It is the combination of basic theory plus the xerographic distribution that can
be predictive and testable by further observations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Theories of our universe are tested using the data that we acquire. When calculating
predictions, we customarily make an implicit assumption that our data D0 occur at a unique
location in spacetime. However, there is a quantum probability for these data to exist in
any spacetime volume. This probability is extremely small in the observable part of the
universe. However, in the large (or infinite) universes considered in contemporary cosmology,
the following predictions often hold:
1. The probability is near unity that our data D0 exist somewhere.
2. The probability is near unity that our data D0 is exactly replicated elsewhere many
times. An assumption that we are unique is then false.
This paper is concerned with the implications of these two statements for science in a very
large universe. Some implications of the first were discussed in [1]. We shall return to these
below, but we first focus on the implications of the second.
II. THIRD-PERSON AND FIRST-PERSON PREDICTION
It is useful to distinguish between first-person and third-person predictions in cosmology.
Third-person predictions are made through the probabilities for alternative features of the
universe that it may exhibit. Examples are the probabilities that the universe is homoge-
neous and isotropic, that it had a certain number of inflationary e-folds in the past, that it
will end in a big crunch, or that it exhibits a certain number of instances of our data D0.
Familiar quantum theories of the universe make such third-person predictions by specifying
a quantum state and a prescription for dynamics (see e.g. [2]); such theories are denoted
by T . But to use and test theories we need predictions of what we will measure or predict.
These are first-person predictions. Defining these is not trivial if there is more than one
instance of our data D0. We now discuss how to do it.
As observers of the universe we are a subsystem within it that we call the human scientific
IGUS1 (HSI). Terms like ‘we’, ‘us’, ‘our’ refer to this specific subsystem. The HSI can
be described at various levels of coarse-graining. Here it is assumed that a description
is fixed at a classical level2. This description can be divided into two parts: First the
data D0 that the HSI has: every scrap of information that the HSI possesses about the
physical universe, including every record of every experiment, every astronomical observation
of distant galaxies, every available description of every leaf, etc., and necessarily every
piece of information about the HSI itself, its members, and its history. Second, there are
the quantities not included in the data but which are necessary for a complete physical
description of the HSI. Location in the universe is one example; physical circumstances that
have not yet been measured is another. (The HSI is assumed to exist at a unique location
in the universe but its data D0 may be duplicated at many other locations in a very large
universe.)
First-person predictions are through the probabilities of what our specific instance of
an IGUS with data D0 will observe or measure. But theories T of a quantum state and
1 IGUS is an acronym for Information Gathering and Utilizing System.
2 More precisely we assume that there is a description in terms of the quasiclassical variables that describe
the quasiclassical realm of everyday experience in terms of a decoherent set of coarse-grained alternative
histories defined in terms of these variables; see e.g. [3] for more detail.
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dynamics do not make such predictions directly if the chance is significant that our data D0
are replicated at different places in the universe. Third-person probabilities computed from
T make no reference to ‘us’ and contain no information about which of several instances of
D0 is ‘us’. A further assumption is therefore needed to connect the third-person probabilities
of theory with the first-person probabilities for our observations. We call this assumption
the xerographic distribution and describe it in the next section.
III. THE XEROGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION
Consider a universe that contains N copies of D0 at different locations in spacetime xA,
A = 1, . . . , N . We are one of these copies, but we have no information as to which, since
our data is replicated at each of these locations. Therefore, to predict what we will observe
in our future, we must choose a distribution that gives the probability ξA that we (the HSI)
are the copy located at xA. The probabilities ξA constitute the xerographic distribution.
Location is used here as an illustration; the xerographic distribution could also refer to any
other aspect of our physical situation that is not specified by the data D0.
As mentioned above, the xerographic distribution is not fixed by usual candidates for
the theory T , such as an initial quantum state and a prescription for its evolution. The
xerographic distribution is a further assumption that must be made (explicitly or implicitly)
in order to make first-person predictions. What is tested by observation is not just the theory
T , but rather the combination (T, ξ); such a combination of a fundamental theory (including
the initial state) T and the xerographic distribution ξ will be called a theoretical framework
or framework for short3.
A natural assumption is that we are typical of the instances of D0; this implies a uniform
xerographic distribution ξA = 1/N . But it is also possible to assume that we are atypical.
We argued in [1] that typicality was no more motivated by observation than atypicality.
More generally, the xerographic distribution can be used to express typicality assumptions
that involve data sets other than D0. For instance, as we have defined it, D0 includes the
results of our observations as well as the conditions for them. But for some purposes it
may be useful to assume that our results are typical of all instances of similar observational
situations. Or it may be useful to assume that observations are typical of those made by
any IGUS in the galaxy, or by any IGUS in the universe. Each of these typicality notions
corresponds to a xerographic distribution that is uniform on the class involved. In the
following we will show that different assumptions about ξ can be testable, and use this to
address the issues raised by the possibility of ‘Boltzmann brains’.
It is important to note that the use of a xerographic distribution does not constitute
a modification of the laws of the quantum mechanics of closed systems. The usual laws,
the usual rules for implementing them (including Born’s rule), and the usual interpretation
apply to third-person probabilities. First-person probabilities are the new feature. These
are made necessary because we, like other IGUSes, are quantum subsystems of the universe
with a non-zero probability of being replicated exactly elsewhere. Quantum theory must
be augmented by a prescription to calculate the first-person probabilities. There is nothing
3 A good case can be made for calling the combination (T, ξ) the ‘theory’, as it is the collection of assump-
tions from which testable predictions are made. But to do so would risk confusion with the usual notion
of a theory as consisting of fundamental laws for dynamics and an initial state. Furthermore the two
parts of the combination (T, ξ) are of different character. The theory T supplies third-person probabilities
for features of the whole universe. The xerographic distribution refers to assumptions about a particular
subsystem: the HSI. For these reasons, in this paper ‘theory’ is used in the usual way, and the combination
(T, ξ) is called a ‘theoretical framework’.
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mysterious or even especially quantum about this prescription because it operates at the
classical level4. Conversely we cannot expect to derive the xerographic distribution from the
rules of quantum theory for third-person probabilities.
IV. COMPARING THEORIES OF LARGE UNIVERSES
Many different criteria can be used by physicists to discriminate between competing the-
oretical frameworks on the basis of the available data D0. Frameworks are favored that
are testable, simple, beautiful, precisely formulable mathematically, economical in their as-
sumptions, comprehensive, unifying, explanatory, accessible to existing intuition, etc. Most
importantly, scientists favor frameworks that are successful in predicting new data beyond
what they have at the moment. That is, they favor frameworks that are predictive. We will
discuss this criterion more fully in Section VI. In this section we discuss the simple idea
that theoretical frameworks can be distinguished by the probabilities (likelihoods) that they
give for the data D0.
The process of distinguishing between frameworks by likelihoods is formalized in the
widely familiar Bayesian schema for testing theories. While seldom applied in practice, this
schema is useful to state the assumptions made in the process clearly and quantitively. The
process involves computing posterior probabilities for frameworks from the likelihoods for
the data D0 and a set of prior probabilities for the competing frameworks
5.
For a very large universe there are different possibilities for a Bayesian comparison of the-
oretical frameworks allowed by the distinction between first-person and third-person prob-
abilities. We can seek to distinguish between theories T on the basis of their third-person
likelihoods for the data D0 independent of any typicality assumption represented by a xe-
rographic distribution. Or, we can seek to distinguish between different frameworks (T, ξ)
on the basis of first-person probabilities that follow from an assumption of a xerographic
distribution. The question of which to use is moot in a small universe where the data D0
are unique to a good approximation and first-person and third-person probabilities agree.
However, the question becomes important in a large universe where the data D0 may be
replicated many times.
First, consider applying the Bayes procedure to distinguish between theories just on the
basis of their third-person predictions for D0. As we emphasized in [1], all we know for
certain from our data D0 is that the universe exhibits at least one instance of it. We do not
know how many times it is replicated or how frequently it occurs. A theory T is consistent
with our data if the probability for at least one instance of our data is nonzero. But, as has
been stressed by many, in a large universe the likelihood that at least one instance of our
data exists somewhere approaches unity for any theory that is consistent with our data. The
third-person Bayes procedure is therefore not effective for discriminating between theories
in a very large universe.
We therefore consider applying the Bayes schema to frameworks (T, ξ). This involves
the following elements: First, prior probabilities P (T, ξ) must be chosen for the different
frameworks. Next, the first-person likelihoods P (1p)(D0|T, ξ) must be computed. Finally,
4 Indeed it would be equally necessary if the theory T were classical [4].
5 A brief review consistent with present notation is given in [1].
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the first-person posterior probabilities are given by
P (1p)(T, ξ|D0) =
P (1p)(D0|T, ξ)P (T, ξ)∑
(T,ξ) P
(1p)(D0|T, ξ)P (T, ξ)
(4.1)
The larger these are, the more favored are the corresponding framework.
As already noted, the theory T and the xerographic distribution ξ correspond to very
different kinds of assumptions. The theory consists of a fundamental quantum state and a
prescription for the dynamics of the universe. These are the quantities that summarize the
universal regularities exhibited by all physical systems within the universe. By contrast the
xerographic distribution ξ concerns a particular subsystem of the universe — the HSI — and
its relation to other subsystems with the same data D0. Priors representing independent
assumptions about T and ξ are therefore natural; this implies a factorization
P (T, ξ) = Pxd(ξ)Pth(T ). (4.2)
With these kind of priors we can compete different theories T with the same typicality
assumption ξ and also compete different typicality assumptions ξ with the same theory T .
There are those who are secure in the faith that the HSI must be typical of all other
IGUSes in the universe despite the absence of any experimental evidence either for or against
the supposition. They will chose a prior Pxd(ξ) that is unity for the ξ that is uniform over the
class of IGUSes, and zero elsewhere. Others, like the authors, who see ξ as an assumption
much like any other will allow different typicality assumptions to be competed against one
another in the search for a successful framework for the universe. The essence of science is
to concede that there is at least some chance that any assumption is incorrect, and then
check for that with experiment and observation. The next section illustrates how this works
in a simple model.
V. A SIMPLE COSMOLOGICAL MODEL
The ideas in the preceding section can be illustrated by the simple red-blue model that
we employed for illustrative purposes in [1]. Consider a model universe which consists of
N cycles in time, k = 1, . . . , N . In each cycle the universe may have one of two global
properties: red (R) or blue (B), which could for example be thought of as two different
possible values of the CMB temperature. In each cycle, there is a probability pE for a
physical system to exist (E) that is able to observe this global property. The model assumes
that the observations are perfectly accurate, so that if red is observed in any cycle, then the
universe is red in that cycle. It is further assumed that whether the universe is red or blue
does not affect whether an observing system exists or not.
Two competing theories of this model universe are proposed. One, all red (AR), in which
all the cycles are red, and another, some red (SR), in which some number of particular cycles
are red and the rest are blue. Suppose that we (the HSI) observe red. Our data D0 is then
(E,R) and we seek to discriminate between the two theories on the basis of the likelihoods
for this data. But as described above there are several choices for these likelihoods.
The use of third-person likelihoods based on the theory T alone was already discussed
above and in [1]. All we know about this universe in third-person terms is that it exhibits at
least one instance of a cycle with (E,R) — the one we are in. The third-person probability
that there is at least one cycle with (E,R) is the same as one minus the probability of the
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negation of this, which is probability that no observing system exists in a cycle in which the
universe is red. Since the probability for an observing system not to exist in any one cycle
is 1− pE, the likelihoods are
P (E,R|T ) = 1− (1− pE)
NR(T ) (5.1)
where NR(T ) is the number of red cycles in theory T , equal to N when T is AR. Our data
do not discriminate between the two theories when NR is large enough in both theories to
make (1 − pE)
NR(T ) ≪ 1. Then P (E,R|T ) ≈ 1 for both theories. Even though there may
be more many more red cycles in the AR theory than the SR theory, the probability that
there is at least one red cycle with an observing subsystem approaches one for both theories
when NR becomes large in both. The likelihoods are the same. Our little bit of data is not
enough to discriminate between the two theories on the basis of third-person probabilities.
The situation is different when we use first-person likelihoods to discriminate between
different frameworks (T, ξ). To illustrate this, consider a variety of typicality assumptions
expressed as different xerographic distributions.
The simplest assumption we can make is that we are typical in the class of other instances
of our dataD0. In the context of the present model that is the assumption that we are equally
likely to be any of the instances of (R,E) — observers that exist in a red cycle. If there
are nR such systems than the probability that we are the Ath instance is 1/nR and the
corresponding xerographic distribution is
ξtypD =
1
nR
, (5.2)
where the superscript ‘typD’ means typical in the class with data D0. The first-person
likelihoods for our data are then denoted by P (1p)(E,R|T, ξtypD).
In Appendix B we work through the transition from third to first-person probabilities
using an explicit example of a typicality assumption and its associated xerographic distri-
bution. That is instructive, but this model is so simple and symmetric that the results for
the likelihoods follow from a few simple arguments.
The xerographic distribution ξtypD is non-zero only on instances of D0 in red cycles. The
probability that we see red, P (1p)(R|E, T, ξtypD), is thus unity trivially and the probability
that we see blue is zero. But then, from the definition of conditional probabilities,
1 = P (1p)(R|E, T, ξtypD) ≡
P (1p)(E,R|T, ξtypD)
P (1p)(E|T, ξtypD)
. (5.3)
The first-person probability that we exist given that we are in a red cycle is the same as the
third-person probability that at least one observing system (us) exists in a red cycle. That
is, from (5.1)
P (1p)(E|T, ξtypD) = 1− (1− pE)
NR(T ). (5.4)
Thus the first-person likelihoods are given by
P (1p)(E,R|T, ξtypD) = 1− (1− pE)
NR(T ). (5.5)
The likelihoods for R and B correctly sum to unity. These first-person likelihoods are
unchanged from the third-person ones (5.1), and no more able to discriminate between
theories than they were.
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We now turn our attention to other possible typicality assumptions represented by differ-
ent xerographic distributions. First let’s consider the assumption that we are typical of all
the observing systems that exist (E) in the model universe — not just the ones that have our
data D0. Equivalently the assumption is that we are equally likely to be any of the observing
systems that the universe exhibits. If there are nO observing systems, then the probability
that we are the Ath instance is 1/nO, and that defines the xerographic distribution
ξtypOA =
1
nO
. (5.6)
The first-person likelihoods for our data are then denoted by P (1p)(E,R|ξtypO, T ).
We are equally likely to exist in any cycle since they are all the same. The probability
that we see red is therefore the probability that our cycle is red. This is NR(T )/N . Thus
P (1p)(R|E, ξtypO, T ) = NR(T )/N. (5.7a)
Similarly the probability that we see blue is
P (1p)(B|E, ξtypO, T ) = NB(T )/N. (5.7b)
We can now proceed as we did above from (5.3) to (5.5). The result for the first-person
likelihoods is
P (1p)(E,R|ξtypO, T ) =
NR(T )
N
[1− (1− pE)
N ]. (5.8)
The ratio of the likelihoods for the two theories is
P (1p)(E,R|ξtypO, AR)
P (1p)(E,R|ξtypO, SR)
=
N
NR(SR)
> 1 (5.9)
Thus, assuming equal priors for the two theories, AR is always favored even if NR(SR)
becomes arbitrarily large provided there are at least some blue cycles.
In the above examples the two theories AR and SR are competed with the same typicality
assumption. But it is also possible to compete different typicality assumptions for the same
theory. Suppose we assign unit prior probability to the theory SR and equal priors to ξtypO
and ξtypD. From (5.8) and (5.5) we find
P (1p)(E,R|ξtypO, SR)
P (1p)(E,R|ξtypD, SR)
=
NR(SR)
N
1− (1− pE)
N
1− (1− pE)NR(SR)
< 1. (5.10)
Thus an assumption of typicality in the class of our data D0 does a better job of explaining
our data (trivially).
Certain theoretical models may imply that the number of instances of our data N is
infinite. An example is provided by the infinite number of Hubble volumes on a surface of
homogeneity inside a Coleman-De Luccia bubble of false vacuum [5]. The results above are
well defined provided that the fractions fR(T ) and fB(T ) of red and blue Hubble volumes
are well defined in the competing theories T . For instance (5.7) becomes
P (1p)(R|E, ξtypO, T ) = fR(T ), P
(1p)(B|E, ξtypO, T ) = fB(T ). (5.11)
and similarly with the other formulae. Indeed, the expressions are generally simpler than
for the finite case since the probability that there is at least one instance of our data (5.4)
becomes exactly unity.
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This set of examples shows that frameworks (T, ξ) are an umbrella formalism for organiz-
ing, comparing, and (most importantly) making explicit a number of different assumptions
that are commonly made in the quantum cosmology of a very large universe. Some of these
possible assumptions will be discussed in more detail in Section VIII and Appendix A.
VI. PREDICTIVITY
First let us consider theories T where there is at most one copy of our data D0. No
xerographic distribution is needed. In this setting, a theory is predictive if the likelihood is
high for some piece of data that we might acquire in the future, given the theory and the data
that we have acquired in the past. To make this more concrete, consider a simplified situation
in which a stream of data d−n, . . . , d−1, d0 is acquired at a sequence of times t−n, . . . , t−1, t0,
where t0 denotes the present time, defined relative to the local clocks provided by each
particular occurrence of D0. Assuming that all this data is accessible now, our present data
is the union, D0 = d−n ∪ . . . ∪ d0. Let P
(1p)(q1|T,D0) be the first-person likelihood that
at some future time t1 we will acquire some piece of data q1; q1 is a subset of all the data
d1 that we acquire at that time. A theory is predictive if, for some kinds of data q1, the
likelihood P (1p)(q1|T,D0) is sharply peaked around particular values q¯1.
There is obvious motivation to favor theories that are predictive and provide a coherent
story connecting past data that we currently have to future data that we may acquire. The
utility of physical theory lies in its predictive power. Theories that are predictive are also
testable in the sense that they are falsifiable when new data disagrees with that predicted.
Indeed, the whole history of science can be read as the search for predictive theories.
We turn now to theories of large universes with replication of our data D0. As already
noted, in this case we can only make predictions if we specify a xerographic distribution ξ in
addition to a conventional theory T . Once the xerographic distribution is specified, we can
(at least in principle) compute the likelihood P (1p)(q1|T, ξ,D0) that we will acquire a piece
of data q1 at a future time t1. A framework (T, ξ) is predictive if, for some kinds of data q1,
the likelihood P (1p)(q1|T, ξ,D0) is sharply peaked around particular values q¯1.
To compute P (1p)(q1|T, ξ,D0), we first compute the third-person likelihood that the data
subset q1 is found at time t1 at the Ath location of the data D0; for this we need only the
theory T and the data D0. Denote this likelihood by P (q1@A|T,D0@A), where x@A means
that data x occurs at location A. Then the likelihood that ‘we’ obtain q1 is
P (1p)(q1|T, ξ,D0) =
∑
A
ξAP (q1@A|ξ, T,D0@A). (6.1)
Without an assumed xerographic distribution, no prediction whatsoever can be made about
what ‘we’ will see in the future. A physical theory that is considered ‘complete’ in the
usual sense (such as a specified quantum state and a rule for its evolution, or even a fully
deterministic classical theory plus initial data) is insufficient to determine the xerographic
distribution, which must therefore be chosen as an additional ingredient of the theoretical
framework.
VII. MAKING THEORIES PREDICTIVE WITH TYPICALITY ASSUMPTIONS
Frameworks (T, ξ) with the same theory T but different assumptions for the xerographic
distribution ξ can be compared and tested. Scientists favor frameworks that are predictive,
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that is, that generate a stream of future predictions and hence are testable.
In this section we give two examples how the predictivity of frameworks (T, ξ) with a
fixed theory T can be affected by different choices of ξ that reflect different assumptions
about the typicality of our data D0 in two different situations.
A. Boltzmann Brains
Thermal or vacuum fluctuations could replicate our data [6, 7]. In one simplified model,
a spatially closed universe originates in a Big Bang and eventually enters a de Sitter phase
that persists forever. It is assumed that there is a very tiny probability per unit spacetime
volume that a ‘brain’ could fluctuate into existence. Such fluctuations are called ‘Boltzmann
brains’ (BBs) or ‘freak observers’ [7]. Since the spacetime volume is infinite in this model
(even though the spatial volume is finite), it is assumed that an infinite number of BBs will
be fluctuated into existence. A tiny fraction of this infinite number have the same data D0
that we do. How do we know that we are not one of them? This is the Boltzmann brain
problem.
Let us accept this scenario uncritically, and ask only if there is an assumption for the
xerographic distribution ξ for which the framework is predictive.
An assumption that we are typical, ξA = 1/N , does not result in a predictive framework.
In that case, we are much more likely to be a BB than an ordinary observer (OO). The
BBs are deluded (e.g [8]); their data suggest that they are 13.7Gyr from a Big Bang, but
typically they are much further away. In contrast to ordinary observers that have 13.7Gyr
of history, the subsequent observations of any particular BB is overwhelmingly likely to be
disordered, and inconsistent with its apparent history. Future data is thus uncorrelated with
D0, and firm predictions cannot be made.
Now let us consider a nonuniform ξ; that is, we assume that we are atypical. In particular,
we suppose that ξA is nonzero only for locations sufficiently close to a Big Bang to make it
much more likely that we are OOs rather than BBs. In this case, the framework is predictive
in the usual way.
The answer to the question ‘How do we know that we are not BBs?’ is this: we do not
know. But if we assume a xerographic distribution ξ such that we are not likely to be BBs,
then we get a predictive, testable framework (T, ξ). Confirmation of the predictions of this
framework by a series of observations then support the original assumption of atypicality.6
B. Laboratory Experiment
Consider a laboratory experiment to determine the value of a fundamental constant α
by a sequence of measurements. We consider a class of theories that predict that α is
constant throughout spacetime, but predict different values for it. In a very large universe,
the experiment will be replicated in many different locations xA in all essential details. For
the vast majority of these experiments the mean value α¯ of the sequence of outcomes will
be close to the true value of the constant to the accuracy of the experiment. But for a tiny
fraction of these experiments, the sequence of measurement outcomes are mistaken — their
6 Others have expressed related ideas, e.g [8].
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mean value α¯ is far from the true value — just by the chances of statistics. How do we know
that our particular sequence of results is not one of these?
The answer lies in the evidence from further measurements. The probabilities for further
measurements can be predicted from the previous ones once a xerographic distribution ξ
is specified. An assumption that that our experiment is typical of all the others results in
a theoretical framework (T (α¯), ξA=1/N), where T (α¯) is the theory that predicts that the
value of the constant is the mean value of the previous outcomes, α¯. The prediction of this
framework is that the next measurement should yield α¯ to within statistical error. Confir-
mation of this prediction by further measurements supports the framework (T (α¯), ξA=1/N),
both as to the value of α and the assumption of typicality.
In the way the problem has been set up, there is no evident variable with which to
make an assumption of atypicality. The physical situations of all the experiments have been
assumed to be the same, in contrast to the different situations represented by BBs and
OOs. As emphasized correctly be a number of authors (e.g. [9]), some kind of typicality is
assumed implicitly in the analysis of every laboratory experiment. Here we have made that
assumption explicit in terms of the xerographic distribution.
VIII. MEASURES FOR COSMOLOGY
In models of eternally inflating cosmologies, relative probabilities for different kinds of
physical situations are defined in terms of the ratios of the number of times they occur.
Examples are the occurrence of different kinds of ‘bubble universes’ and the ratio of the
number of BBs to OOs. Since the numbers are typically infinite, a ‘measure’ is required to
define these fractions; without a measure, third-person probabilities are ill-defined.
Ideally, such a measure would emerge unambiguously from an underlying theory (such
as string theory). In this case, the ‘measure problem’ would be solved, and third-person
probabilities could be computed.
However, a xerographic distribution would still be needed in order to define and compute
first-person probabilities. Solving the measure problem does not remove the need to choose
a xerographic distribution, but does make the choice of a uniform xerographic distribution
well defined.
In some models (e.g. [2]), there is a natural choice for the measure. However, in more
general contexts there is as yet no consensus for how to determine the measure from the
underlying theory, or even whether this is possible (see e.g. [9, 10] for discussions). If it
turns out that the measure is not computable from the underlying theory, then whatever
freedom remains in the choice of the measure can and should be incorporated into the choice
of the xerographic distribution.
Starting from a different perspective, Page [11] has also argued that the quantum wave
function alone contains insufficient information for the calculation of probabilities of subse-
quent observations by a particular observer when there are multiple copies of that observer.
His work is discussed in Appendix A.
IX. CONCLUSION
The possibility that our data may be replicated exactly elsewhere in a very large universe
profoundly affects the way science must be done.
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Central to cosmology are the third-person probabilities for properties of the universe given
a theory T of its quantum dynamics and quantum state. But of even greater interest are
the first-person probabilities for the results of observation carried out by us — a particular
subsystem of the universe — conditioned on our existing data. These probabilities are the
means to test any prescription for prediction. In a very large universe, where our data will
be replicated elsewhere with significant probability, predicting these probabilities requires
not only a theory T but also but also a probability distribution on the set of copies of us.
This xerographic distribution cannot, even in principle, be determined from a theory of the
dynamics and the quantum state since such a theory has nothing to say about which copy
is ‘us’. It is only the theoretical framework consisting of both a theory and an assumed
xerographic distribution that is predictive and testable by observation.
In cosmology we should favor theoretical frameworks that generate a stream of predictions
from our data that are confirmed by subsequent observation. The authors believe that
choices of both the theory T and the xerographic distribution ξ should be competed against
other alternatives, and that no element of the theoretical framework should be assigned a
unit probability.
Ideas that imply particular notions of typicality (such as the ‘Copernican principle’,
‘anthropic principle’, or the ‘principle of mediocrity’) cannot be universal laws of nature if
only because they refer to a negligibly minor subsystem of the universe: ‘us’. In the present
context, these are simply notions that can motivate a particular choice of the xerographic
distribution.
It is no surprise that information about us is required to make predictions for our obser-
vations. Our data suggest that we are located some 13.7Gyr from a Big Bang. To make
a reliable prediction from that information, we have to assume that it truly describes our
physical situation.
If the universe is rife with delusion, we must assume that we are atypical in order to have
predictive and testable scientific theories. Indeed, it is only by making such assumptions
that we are able to do science in a very large universe. We imagine that even Copernicus
would have agreed that it was necessary to assume that Ptolemy was not deluded in his
observations of the planets.
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Appendix A: The Work of Page as an Example
As mentioned above, the schema for quantum cosmological prediction developed here
provides a common framework for the discussion of different prescriptions for science in a
very large universe. Prescriptions for which notions of first- and third-person probabilities
can be distinguished, and a xerographic distribution identified.
Notable among these different presciptions are those found in the extensive contributions
of Don Page [11–13]. In this Appendix we attempt to fit at least some parts of his ideas
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into the present context, in part to address his criticisms of our earlier work [1].
Page reaches the conclusion that Born’s rule of usual quantum theory must be modified
to apply to a very large universe where our data have a significant chance of being replicated
elsewhere. We disagree with this conclusion as we now explain.
We begin with Page’s discussion of Born’s rule. In [13], he says that “a goal of science is to
produce complete theories Ti that each predict normalized probabilities Pj(i) for observations
Oj”. These are the probabilities for observations made by “the observer”. We interpret these
as first-person probabilities for alternative outcomes of our observations. For example they
might be the probabilities for alternative CMB temperature maps or the alternatives red
and blue in the R/B model. The sum of the probabilities of an exhaustive set of exclusive
outcomes is of course 1. This is illustrated explicitly by (5.7).
We agree with Page that first-person probabilities are not specified by the quantum state
of the universe alone. As we have argued, a xerographic distribution is needed to to connect
them to the third-person probabilities that are specified by the quantum state. However this
does not mean that ‘Born’s rule dies.’ Born’s rule is alive, well, and essential for constructing
third-person probabilities.
Page suggests various candidates for replacing Born’s rule. In his nomenclature [12], our
xerographic distribution for the assumption that we are typical of all the observing systems
that exist appears to be equivalent to Page’s rule 5, which he calls ‘observational averaging’.
Constructions such as those of Page or the theoretical frameworks discussed in this paper
are tested by comparing observations with the first-person predictions for them. The third-
person probabilities for features of the universe are essential for computing these. For
instance, both Page’s candidates for replacing Born’s rule and the examples of xerographic
distributions in this paper rely on an assumption of classical spacetime to make notions
of location meaningful. But classical spacetime is neither fundamental nor inevitable in a
quantum theory of gravity. Whether a quantum state predicts an ensemble of alternative
classical spacetimes is a question of whether the third-person probabilities are high for
correlations in time governed by the Einstein equation for suitably coarse grained histories
of geometry and matter fields (e.g. [2]). Third-person probabilities are thus not dispensable;
they are essential for the understanding of our quantum universe.
Appendix B: Third to First in the R/B Model with a Xerographic Distribution
In this appendix the first-person likelihoods (5.8) in the red-blue model of Section V
are derived by explicitly considering the form of the xerographic distribution ξtypO without
invoking the symmetry of the model directly.
We start with the third-person probability P (nO, nR|T ) that of the N total cycles, nO
are occupied by observing systems, with nR of these in red cycles. The probability that
there are nO cycles occupied by observing systems is p
nO
E (1 − pE)
N−nO multiplied by the
number of ways of arranging nR observing systems in NR red cycles and the number of ways
of arranging nB = nO − nR observing systems in NB = N −NR blue cycles. This is
P (nO, nR|T ) =
(
NR
nR
)(
N −NR
n− nR
)
pnOE (1− pE)
N−nO (B1)
The theoretical framework consists of the theory T and a xerographic distribution that
assumes we are a typical in the class of observing systems. The n observing systems can be
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labeled by an index A that runs from 1 to n. The xerographic distribution that says we are
equally likely to be any one of these systems is
ξtypOA =
1
nO
, (B2)
which satisfies
nO∑
A=1
ξtypOA = 1. (B3)
With these assumptions the first-person likelihood P (1p)(E,R|ξtypO, T ) that we exist and
observe red is ξtypOA times the third-person probability P (nO, nR|T ) summed over A and the
alternative configurations specified by (nO, nR). In general the third-person probabilities
would depend on which cycles are occupied and hence on A. But in the present case where
they are all identical there is no such dependence. The result is
P (1p)(E,R|ξtypO, T ) =
N∑
nO=1
nO∑
nR=1
nR∑
A=1
ξtypOA P (nO, nR|T ) (B4)
Substituting in (B1) and (B2) and performing the sum over A, we get
P (1p)(E,R|ξtypO, T ) =
N∑
nO=1
nO∑
nR=1
nR
nO
(
NR
nR
)(
N −NR
nO − nR
)
pnOE (1− pE)
N−nO
=
N∑
nO=1
NR
nO
nO∑
nR=1
(
NR − 1
nR − 1
)(
N −NR
nO − nR
)
pnOE (1− pE)
N−nO
=
N∑
nO=1
NR
nO
(
N − 1
nO − 1
)
pnOE (1− pE)
N−nO
=
NR
N
N∑
nO=1
(
N
nO
)
pnOE (1− pE)
N−nO
=
NR
N
[1− (1− pE)
N ] , (B5)
where the third line follows from Vandermonde’s identity.
We see that (B5) is the same as (5.8). The argument based on symmetry given in Section
V is evidently a more efficient way of getting this result. A general case without symmetry
would be even more complicated. Suppose for example there was a different value of pE for
each cycle. Then the third-person probabilities would depend on which cycles were occupied
and not just on the total number of them as here. The prescription for computation however
would be essentially the same: calculate the third-person probabilities for a configuration
of occupied and unoccupied cycles; multiply by the xerographic distribution; sum over the
possible configurations.
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